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Abstract 
The current crisis has been seen as the result of a “few bad apples”. The paper argues that the 
crisis is systemic and based on fallacies and misconceptions in the design and function of the 
economic – corporate system. Organizational and economic theories are based on hypotheses 
that lead to faulted decisions on how the system should be regulated and designed.   
The paper proposes that a new theory is needed. Disjoint approaches of the current situation 
are not suitable. Law, Organization theory, Economics, Finance and Accounting need to 
converge in order to formulate a theory that encompasses all factors and it is holistic. 
Introduction of corporate governance systems that are as dynamic as the organizational, 
ownership, product and capital market are, are necessary in order to create a stable and 
effective corporate environment.  
Keywords: Crisis, Fallacies, Corporate Collapses, Corporate Governance  
Introduction 
After the recent scandals, only few scholars and politicians have realized that the old 
paradigms and practices may not apply any more. Conformist theory scientists believed that 
the introduction of new laws, regulations and statues was the answer. Sarbanes – Oxley Act 
and corresponding legal initiatives as well as the new and improved accounting and auditing 
standards have failed to prevent the emergence of new corporate breakdowns.  
The old theories of corporate and organizational structure and behavior have also failed to 
point out the causes of corporate collapses and to provide analytical tools to remove 
implementing discrepancies and flaws. The agency theory can’t fully interpret the behavior 
and practices of executive managers in the USA and corporate and organizational structure in 
Continental Europe. The stakeholder theory is unable to provide a reasonable and acceptable 
3 
 
role to every stakeholder group, in order to justify it. The managerial hegemony theory 
focuses mainly on the main problem in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Managers are not responsive to any regulatory and legal controls and restraints. Even 
recently, a bank executive manager has raised his remuneration levels even though his firm 
had been funded by the U.S. government. Managers are willing to ask for capital from the 
government but not as willing to be subjected to controls and monitor. Managers of large 
corporations are forcing the political system, threatening to go bankrupt and hence they create 
political pressure to bail them out of the crisis.  
Market, corporate control and capital, are not as efficient as the theorists hypothesized. 
Capital markets didn’t react at the time and way they were supposed to. Corporate valuations 
and accounting standards were influenced, one way or the other, by the dominant group 
(managers). The market for corporate control was based on capital markets, accounting 
standards and valuation techniques that were mostly based on data provided by auditors and 
executive managers. Merger and acquisitions seem to be the instrument of empire building or 
the establishment of wealth maximization illusion. Popular capitalism has failed to diffuse 
wealth but instead didn’t fail to diffuse risk and loses.  
Legislators (politicians) have been trying to maintain market and social stability with the help 
of economists and legal experts. The state has become a major stakeholder providing funds, 
organizational stability and assurance. The state’s intervention goal is to avoid market and 
trust collapse. Managers and other dominant stakeholders are lobbying to minimize the 
control and monitor mechanisms the state has established as safety mechanisms for its 
intervention. On the other hand, the potential gains-rights of the state for providing funds are 
the same as the ones of a lender and not the ones of a shareholder. The implicit fear of 
introducing the state as shareholder has increased the pressure to mitigate the state’s 
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participation in firm’s equity capital by minimizing the rights and benefits of shareholders. 
Furthermore, corporations are the largest contributors to election campaigns. A nexus of 
relations connects executives and major shareholders with political parties and politicians. 
Politicians have consented to mitigate the rights of the stakeholders that they represent in 
order to preserve the integrity of the market and hence to serve the greater good. The problem 
is that this transaction does not fit well in the economic logic.  
Fallacies 
Corporate governance is not a new notion or issue. It is closely related to the notion of the 
firm itself, both in time and essence. Corporate Governance notion and theory began with 
Adam Smith’s (1776) “Wealth of Nations”. Smith didn’t only create the notion but also 
“predicted” the main problems that preoccupy corporation, governments, shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Smith (1776) pointed out the agency problem by suggesting that 
executives that control other people’s money should not be expected to show the same 
diligence as the owners themselves. Furthermore, Smith (1776) described the potential effect 
that corporate elite may induce on the social and economic well status when he stated that 
business people “seldom gather together except to conspire against the public interest” (as 
cited in Turnbull, 2005).  
As corporations became larger in size, the dependency of social well being and economic 
stability on corporations has increased as well. The basic model for the development of 
corporations has changed. The fundamental entity of the Entrepreneur that had the basic idea 
for a product or service, initiated production and managed day to day operations isn’t the 
prevailing paradigm. Complexity of today’s operational needs, intense competition and the 
need for capital accumulation has introduced a new paradigm of corporation, where the 
shareholder, even the founder, has been separated from the control of the firm. Berle and 
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Means (1932) were the first to create a theoretical framework for the separation of ownership 
and control. A new player in the corporate game has been introduced: the executive manager.  
Hellwig (1998) quotes  Carl Fürstenberg (1850-1933), a German banker who is even more 
picturesque, arguing that “shareholders are stupid and impertinent – stupid because they give 
their money to somebody else without any effective control over what this person is doing 
with it and impertinent because they ask for a dividend as a reward for their stupidity”.  
Three major fallacies in theory formulation can be identified in the literature. The fallacy is 
not the theory itself but the way it was used to formulate principles, policies and corporate 
cultures. All theories may serve as good analytical and educational tools. When theory 
becomes practice without taking into account the social, cultural and political status and 
dynamics, crisis is the result. As Williamson (2000) argues “reliance by law and economics 
on the orthodox theory of the firm-as-production function, which is a technological 
construction, has led to a truncated understanding of economic organization and has resulted 
in public policy error. Although there are reasons to believe that the worst such errors are 
behind us, the future will present new puzzles for which public policy error is a lurking 
concern”. Williamson (2000) made a plea for a new perspective in theory formulation, a 
perspective that captures and incorporates the full spectrum of dimensions and dynamics of a 
corporation and an economic system, is more necessary than ever before.  
The first fallacy is the one of the efficient market (Fama, 1970, 1991). Since the seminal work 
of Fama a doctrine has been created. The market itself can solve the problems and create new 
balance. What Fama introduced in 1970 was not new. Adam Smith had introduced the notion 
with notion of “invisible hand” of the market. Friendman throughout the 1970s advocated the 
idea that corporations should be free to do business without any interference from the 
government. In the next decade this idea was surrogated politically by conservative parties 
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around the world. President Reagan in one of his speeches has stated that “Government is not 
the solution to our problem, Government is the problem. … The societies that achieved the 
most spectacular broad based progress in the shortest period of time are not the most tightly 
control, not necessarily the biggest in size or the wealthiest in natural resources. No, what 
unites them all is their willingness to believe in the magic of the marketplace” (Ronald 
Reagan, President of United States). And so the deregulation of the markets has found strong 
political and social support. In some cases it worked. As Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004, p. 
47) in their study argue, the market for corporate control was effective in solving the problem 
of undervalued corporations, in the 1970s and 1980s but wasn’t as effective in the case of 
overvalued corporation in the 1990s.  
The term “efficient market” has been used, until recently, even by the most prestigious and 
influencing organizations, i.e. OECD. OECD (2006, p. 14) supports the idea that the 
corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets”. So, 
according to OECD efficient market is the outcome of good corporate governance and not 
vice versa. Hence, efficient market may not be the solution by itself. Other prerequisites exist. 
Corporations and governments should formulate a framework that enhances corporate 
governance1.  
The second fallacy is the fallacy of “efficient corporations” or the lack of understanding the 
inner workings of real firms. According to this notion organizational structure, behaviors, 
system of delegating power, authority and accountability can change without any costs and 
instantly just because an efficient structure has been identified elsewhere in the corporate 
system. The last corporate scandals have proved that corporations can’t / won’t or are not able 
                                                            
1  “The only solution to the agency problem of overvalued equity is an effective corporate governance 
system” (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004, p. 48) 
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to adapt to external stimulation so quickly. The fact that many corporations in the USA are 
still struggling to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requirements is an indication 
for the validity of the previous argument. Through the neoclassical prism of thought, the firm 
is an integral participant in the market and its existence is dominated by the market. Coase has 
quite early noted that “the economist does not interest himself in the internal arrangements 
within organizations but only what happens on the market” (Coase, 1992, p. 714 as cited in 
Williamson, 2000). Adopting a monolith approach to a multidimensional problem is a very 
bad start to have a sufficiently adequate solution. Kaplan and Norton (1992) (their four 
example perspectives are: financial, customer, internal business process, and learning and 
growth) have captured the notion that a complex organization with many stakeholders and 
equally many interests and goals needs a multidimensional performance measure. A firm, in 
order to be efficient, must address issues that are outside the norms of monolithic economic 
and managerial thought. A firm is an entity that has to coexist and develop in a market and in 
a society. A firm has to adopt more complex behavioral patterns and become political in the 
Aristotelian sense. The market is as complex as the firms and stakeholders that participate in 
it. Firms and stakeholders must adopt adequate solutions to deal with the complexity of the 
market. The efficient corporation is a corporation that takes into account all factors of the 
market and the society in which it is active.  
A third fallacy is that the neoclassic theory, although preoccupied with consumer behavior, 
has abolished in its theoretical perspective, the dynamic and sometimes irrational (or not 
covered by any behavioral theory) nature of human behavior and also the dynamics that is 
developed in the interaction of people with the social, economic and political system. The 
basic assumption of the neoclassical theory is that human behavior can change instantly 
because people are homo economicus and individuals adapt to a more efficient behavior or 
react and adapt to an external stimulus. The problem is systemic (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Jensen, 
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Murphy and Wruck (2004, p. 44) have put one’s finger into the print of the nails arguing that 
“before we can “solve” current problems we must be sure we understand their root cause. The 
root cause was not that many executives suddenly decided to be crooks, but rather lies with 
the system in which they are working”. 
All three fallacies are in essence one. Market, corporations and human beings are perceived as 
entities with only one goal and that goal is wealth maximization. This approach is based on 
the hyper rationalization assumption out of which orthodox economics works (see the work of 
Simon, 1985). A quantifiable and easy to comprehend, and hence rational, goal is wealth 
maximization. Aristotle’s philosophy considers wealth as an inferior goal and that well-being 
or happiness is the ultimate goal. Adam Smith thought that well-being may be the result of the 
pursuit of wealth. The prerequisites for Smith’s and Aristotle’s perception of economy are the 
existence of perfect markets, socialized participants, implicit political and governance 
procedures and, finally the Aristotelian notion of order. Politics, ethics and economy are 
interlaced and interconnected.  
Politics and ethics play a more crucial role in a market that is mainly dominated by 
oligopolies and cartels. Today’s market has a growing presence of cartels and oligopolies. 
The history of deregulation is evidence of the political power of corporations and economic 
power.  
The notion of shareholder is not as clear as the literature suggests. A fuzzy line of ownership 
exists. It is not always so easy to detect the real owner of a share or the owner of a financial 
product to detect the firms that the fund, bank or firm has invested in. Accountability, 
responsibility and transparency principles of corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004) 
are difficult to implement if one of the main subjects, focal points or stakeholder of corporate 
governance is difficult to specify or determine. Ownership fuzziness creates an inner 
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environment that facilitates the dominance of the controlling party and minimizes the 
probability of monitor and control. 
Both main corporate governance theories (agency and stakeholder) focus on the firm – 
shareholder. Stakeholder theory recognizes the state as a stakeholder but doesn’t describe a 
role, function or rights and responsibilities of the state. Society and the state are the ones that 
were called to buy – out many firms and banks during the current crisis. A problem with the 
state as a stakeholder is that the firm may be multinational and hence borderless, whereas the 
state has borders. Which state should pay for the survival of the firm?. A second problem is 
that a citizen can’t exert monitor and control because he is not identified as a legitimate 
shareholder – stakeholder.  
Corporate Collapses - Failures 
There is a mistaken cognizance of the time and situations needed that lead to corporate 
collapses. “Failure does not happen suddenly…, problems build up and intensify, causing the 
organization to finally lapse into systemic failure” (Choo, 2008). Corporations do no fail 
because there are some “bad apples” (Davis, Payne and McMahan, 2007) or suddenly. They 
fail due to bad leadership, unethical behavior and market’s inefficiencies or flaws (i.e. 
oligopolies).  Due to previously mentioned theoretical fallacies, collapses and failures cannot 
be fully explained by the existing dominant theories, like the agency theory. The neoclassical 
notion that executive remuneration and prices can create internal (corporate) and external 
(market) equilibrium simply failed.  
The current crisis is interconnected with the crisis of the corporate governance system. 
Corporate governance fallacies and failures have functioned as catalyst to speed up or to 
amplify the financial crisis and its consequences (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Current corporate 
governance systems relinquish diffused shareholders without sufficient information for the 
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risk that the firm is taking while pursuing high performance and without a well perceived and 
calculated valuation of the firm (Dong, et al., 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Both main corporate governance mechanisms (monitor & control and alignment incentives) 
failed to provide or to assure a stable and functional framework for the corporations. Board of 
Directors members, committee members, auditors, legislators, lawyers, accountants didn’t or 
wouldn’t or couldn’t fulfill their fiduciary duties. Their failure had some factual causes. The 
corporate world is very complex and fast. The complexity and speed is increasing as time 
passes by. These people didn’t have the time, resources or even the knowledge and skills to 
comprehend and maneuver in this complex corporate environment. Many of them, probably 
due to their self confidence in their past, abilities and achievements, didn’t evaluate and take 
into account the systemic risk. Furthermore, the agency problem created an asymmetry of 
performance horizon, over-investment and the illusion of perpetual high performance. 
Managers had a short term horizon and shareholders (at least for majority of them) a long 
term horizon. Managers may act as free riders, while shareholders due to false or distorted 
information were left to have a distorted notion for the firm’s valuation and prospect.  
  Corporations are microsocieties (Winjnberg, 2000, p. 334) whereas markets are an integral 
part of the society in general. Dierksmeier and Pirson (2009) study Aristotle’s contribution to 
the current crisis and economic theory. They argue that “it has been in the comparatively short 
time-span from 1800 to date alone that economics has aspired and (to some degree) managed 
to sever itself from its cultural embedding and from its intellectual moorings in political 
philosophy”. Aristotle argued that politics is the essential element of every society or group of 
people. In order for the society to be, a system of governance must be created and politics 
within the system needs to be applied. Within this political system, executive managers (in the 
Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance) and major shareholders (in the Continental 
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Europe system of corporate governance) are leaders with fiduciary duties. Some researchers 
propose that executives should be paid as bureaucrats (Frey and Osterloh, 2004). Contrary to 
the argument of Frey and Osterloh (2004), managers must not be paid as bureaucrats or even 
as value optimizers because, above all, they are leaders and political personalities with the 
fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the microsociety called corporation and to create 
institutions, mechanisms and culture that serve these interests.  
It is no surprise that, even now (mid 2009), there is evidence that many executives pander to 
the system’s inefficiencies in order to retain or increase their remuneration levels, even 
thought their corporations are failing or are in distress. Crisis and deviant behavior is the 
aftermath of systemic failure and fallacies in its design. 
Crisis 
Two hundred years of corporate development haven’t solved the problems of corporate goal 
determination (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004), ethics, incomplete contracts and 
asset/wealth distribution. In the last thirty years a large number of theories or theory groups 
have been formulated (for the main theories see Table 1) to address the issues of corporate 
governance. It is no coincidence that each theory group has occurred after an economic crisis 
or economic boom. This is an indication that crises and abnormal economic activity are a 
good incentive for theory formulation and fallacy detection.  
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Table 1. Main Theories of Corporate Governance 
Theory Main scholars and references Main concern - hypothesis Crisis2 
Agency 
theory 
Berle and Means (1932) 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Separation of ownership and 
control, principal – agent 
relation – conflict of 
interests 
1929-1932 
1972 
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory 
 
Mace (1971) 
Vance (1983) 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
Board of Directors are a 
legal fiction dominated by 
management 
 
1978 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stanford Research Institute 
(1963) 
Freeman (1984) 
Donaldson, T. & Preston, L. 
(1995) 
Vinten (2000, 2001) 
Α firm should be run in the 
interests of all its 
stakeholders rather than just 
the shareholders. 
1980 
Stewardship 
theory 
 
Donaldson (1990) 
Davis et al. (1997) 
Muth and Donaldson (1998) 
 
Managers are motivated by 
“a need to achieve, to gain 
intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing 
inherently challenging 
work, to exercise 
responsibility and authority, 
and thereby gain recognition 
from peers and bosses” 
Asian crisis 
1997 
Resource 
dependence 
theory 
 
Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991; Goodstein et al., 
1994 
Focuses on the role of 
interlocking directorates in 
linking firms to both 
competitors and other 
stakeholders (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989) 
1972, 1978 
                                                            
2 A short list of some major financial crises since 20th century 
1910 –  Shanghai rubber stock market crisis 
1930s –  The Great Depression – the largest and most important economic depression in the 20th century 
1973 –  1973 oil crisis – oil prices soared, causing the 1973–1974 stock market crash 
1980s –  Latin American debt crisis – beginning in Mexico 
1987 –  Black Monday (1987) – the largest one-day percentage decline in stock market history 
1989-91 –  United States Savings & Loan crisis 
1990s –  Japanese asset price bubble collapsed 
1992-93 –  Black Wednesday – speculative attacks on currencies in the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism 
1994-95 – 1994 economic crisis in Mexico – speculative attack and default on Mexican debt 
1997-98 –  1997 Asian Financial Crisis – devaluations and banking crises across Asia 
2007-09 –  The American financial crisis of 2007–2009 helped create the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009, thus creating the late 2000s recession. 
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What is very interesting is that for the current crisis, no theory has been formulated yet. The 
old theories can’t explain the magnitude and spread of the current crisis. Purely economic, 
financial, legal and/or political causes failed to establish a good and reasonable causal relation 
to the crisis’s phenomena. The main reason is that the crisis is the result of a crisis in the 
educational, ethical, cultural and political level of the organized societies. Corporate 
governance system’s inelasticity may tamper with competition and reduce the effectiveness of 
any initiatives (legal – mandatory or voluntary) and acts as a factor of problem accumulation 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
The first battle of the current crisis has been given and lost in the classrooms of universities in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s. The prevailing theories and ideology has been formulated as agency 
and stewardship theory. Executives and professionals have been nominated as guardians of 
other people’s property, regardless Smith’s two hundred years warnings and suggestions.  The 
second battle has been fought on the political level. The stake was the formulation and 
justification of the market’s deregulation and the liberalization theory. While promoting free 
markets, oligopolies were formulated and political influence of corporations was increased 
dramatically. Corporations may dictate, more or less, the legal environment, especially in the 
common law countries. Legal initiatives like Sarbanes – Oxley Act in USA, although in the 
right direction have been challenged by major corporations (see Quinn, 2008;  
http://www.insidesarbanesoxley.com/2007/03/judge-dismisses-sarbanes-oxley-lawsuit.html) 
and by activists that argue that the impact of the law is weak. It is true that Sarbanes – Oxley 
Act in the USA wasn’t able to prevent the 2008 corporate collapses.  
Now What? 
Since the outbreak of the current crisis a new theory is needed. Disjoint approaches of the 
current situation are not suitable. Law and Organization theory, Economics, Finance and 
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Accounting need to converge in order to formulate a theory that encompasses all factors and 
is holistic. Until now the observable speed of behavior for people, corporations, markets and 
states has been slow. In the last fifteen years globalization and information technology have 
reduced product life cycle, expectations, response time to external stimuli, production time 
and capital and product circulation speed. Turbulent and complex inner and outer 
environment are difficult to comprehend and control. Managers’ advertised abilities to lead 
corporations under distress and complexity to success were the motive for shareholders to hire 
them. Shareholders were willing to lose control over the expectation of capital returns and 
minimized cost of monitor and control. They lost their initial function and distanced 
themselves even from the company they had provided with capital.  
Deregulation and managers’ - major shareholders’ unchallenged empowerment have led to the 
loosening of the bonds of shareholders with their corporations. Shareholders ceased to be 
members of the corporate microsociety and participants in the “political” processes. They 
became members of the outer environment. As non members of the microsociety any interest 
regarding the corporation’s procedures and corporate politics is diminished. Static corporate 
governance systems have induced this shareholders’ inertness. Kirkpatrick (2009) proposes 
the introduction of corporate governance systems that are as dynamic as the organizational, 
ownership, product and capital market are.  
Conclusions 
The current crisis is neither the outcome of a “few bad apples” nor the aftermath of a glitch in 
the system. Fallacies in the system’s “design” have created the substratum of corporate 
collapses and failures. No new theory has been formulated to address the issues and problems 
that the crisis has revealed. The old theories were developed during the last 30-40 years and 
their explanatory power has been weakened by their bias to a specific group of stakeholders 
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and the non holistic view and approach. The world’s economy and corporations can’t afford 
academic, systemic and theory myopia. There is a need for the introduction of a new holistic 
theory that encompasses all relevant branches of science. Furthermore, the introduction of a 
dynamic corporate governance system is critical to the stability of the corporate system and 
the market itself. The system must address the issues of ethics and human behavior in general 
as well as the organizational and market structure issues.  
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